Abstract
Introduction
The Model and its Motivation. Safety and security have traditionally been included among the key issues for the design and operation of a distributed system. With the unprecedented advent of the Internet, there is a growing interest among the Distributed Computing community in formal-izing, designing and analyzing distributed systems prone to security attacks and defenses. A new dimension is that Internet hosts and clients are controlled by selfish agents whose interest is the local maximization of their own benefits (rather than optimizing global performance). So, it is challenging to consider the simultaneous impact of selfish and malicious behavior of Internet agents. In this work, a distributed system is modeled as a graph G = (V, E); nodes represent the hosts and edges represent the links.
An attacker (also called virus) is a malicious client that targets a host to destroy. Associating attacks with nodes make sense since malicious attacks are often targeted at destroying individual servers. A defender is a non-malicious client modeling the antivirus software implemented on a link in order to protect its two connected hosts. Associating defenses with edges is motivated by Network Edge Security [8] ; this is a recently proposed, distributed, firewall architecture, where antivirus software, rather than being statically installed and licensed at a host, is implemented by a distributed algorithm running on a specific subnetwork. Such distributed implementations are attractive since they offer to the hosts more fault-tolerance and the benefit of sharing the licensing costs. In this work, we focus on the simplest possible case where the subnetwork is just a single link; a precise understanding of the mathematical pitfalls of attacks and defenses for this simplest case is a necessary prerequisite to making progress for the general case.
Since malicious attacks are independent, each trying to maximize the amount of harm it causes during its lifetime, it is natural to model each attacker as a strategic player wishing to maximize the chance of escaping the antivirus software; thus, the strategy of one attacker does not (directly) affect the profit of another. In contrast, one may consider at least three approaches for modeling the defenses: (1) Defenses are not strategic at all; such an assumption would lead to a (centralized) optimization problem of computing the best locations for the defenders (given that attackers are strategic). (2) Defenses are strategic, and they cooperate to maximize the number of caught viruses. This is modeled by assuming a single (strategic) defender, which centrally chooses multiple links and it has been studied in [5] . (3) Defenses are strategic and non-cooperative.
We have chosen the third approach. This choice is motivated as follows: (1) In a large network, the defense policies are independent and decentralized. Hence, it may not be so realistic to assume that a centralized entity coordinates all defenses. (2) There are financial incentives offered by hosts to heterogeneous (locally installed) defense mechanisms on the basis of effectiveness (i.e., number of sustained attacks); for example, prices for antivirus software may be determined on the basis of recommendation systems, which collect data about effectiveness from scrutinized hosts. Such incentives induce a natural competition among the defenses. (3) Think of a network owner, who is interested in maximizing the protection of the network against attacks; the selfish owner has subcontracted the task to a set of independent, deployable agents, and tries to optimize the protection in order to be paid more.
We justify the assumption that defenses are non-cooperative by considering an intuitive reward-sharing scheme among the defenders. When more than one colocated defenders are extinguishing the same attacker(s), each will be rewarded with the fair share of the number of attackers caught. Thus, each defender is a strategic player wishing to maximize its fair share of the number of attackers caught. We assume that there are ν attackers and µ defenders; they are allowed to use mixed strategies. In a Nash equilibrium [13, 14] , no player can unilaterally increase its (expected) profit. Motivated by the Price of Stability [1] , we study DefenseOptimal Nash equilibria, where the ratio of the expected number of attackers extinguished by the defenders, over the optimum ν, called Defense-Ratio, is as small as possible.
(Contrast this to worst-case equilibria and the Price of Anarchy [6] .) The very special but yet highly non-trivial case of this model with a single defender was already introduced in [12] and further studied in [5, 9, 10, 11] .
The Game. Fix integers ν ≥ 1 and µ ≥ 1. Associated with G is a strategic game Π ν,µ (G) on G:
• The set of players is N = NA ∪ ND, where NA contains ν attackers Ai and ND contains µ defenders Di. • The strategy set SA i of attacker Ai is V , and the strategy set SD i of defender Di is E. So, the strategy set S of the game
• -The Individual Profit of attacker Ai is a function
Intuitively, when the attacker Ai chooses vertex v, he receives 0 if it is caught by a defender; otherwise, he receives 1.
-The Individual Profit of defender Dj is a function
where (u, v) = sD j and for each vertex v ∈ V , defenderss(v) = {Di ∈ ND | v ∈ sD i } Intuitively, the defender Dj receives the fair share of the total number of attackers choosing each of the two end vertices of the edge it chooses.
In the sequel, we will, by abuse of notation, use IPs(Ai) and IPs(Di) for IPA i (s) and IPD i (s), respectively; we do so in order to emphasize reference to the player rather than to s.
The profile s is a pure Nash equilibrium [13, 14] if for each player i ∈ N , it maximizes IP i (s) over all profiles t that differ from s only with respect to the strategy of player i; so, a pure Nash equilibrium is a local maximizer for the Individual Profit of each player. Say that G admits a pure Nash equilibrium, or G is pure, if there is a pure Nash equilibrium for the strategic game Π ν,µ (G).
A mixed strategy for player i ∈ N is a probability distribution over S i ; so, a mixed strategy for an attacker (resp., a defender) is a probability distribution over vertices (resp., edges [13, 14] if for each player i ∈ N , it maximizes IP i (s) over all profiles t that differ from s only with respect to the mixed strategy of player i; so, a Nash equilibrium is a local maximizer of the Expected Individual Profit of each player. (Note that by the celebrated Theorem of Nash [13, 14] , Π ν,µ (G) has at least one Nash equilibrium.)
The Defense-Ratio DR s of a Nash equilibrium s is the ratio of the optimal gain ν of the defenders over their expected gain in s; so,
. Clearly, it is desirable that a Nash equilibrium s maximizes the sum Di∈N IP s (D i ), representing the total gain of all defenders; equivalently, s should minimize DR s .
Summary of Results.
We are interested in the possibility of achieving, and the complexity of computing, a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium using a given number of defenders. Note that the number of defenders in this theoretical model directly translates into the real cost of purchasing and installing several units of (licensed) antivirus software. So, this question addresses the cost-effectiveness of an economic investment in security for a distributed system. Through a comprehensive collection of results, we discover that the answer depends in a quantitatively subtle way on the number of defenders: There are two graph-theoretic thresholds, namely |V | 2 and β (G) -the size of a Minimum Edge Cover (cf. Section 2, second paragraph), which determine this possibility. (Recall that always |V | 2 ≤ β (G).)
, there are cases with a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium.
we provide a combinatorial characterization of graphs admitting a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium (Theorem 5.3).
Roughly speaking, these make a subclass of the class of graphs with a Fractional Perfect Matching where it is possible to partition some Fractional Perfect Matching into µ smaller, vertex-disjoint Fractional Perfect Matchings so that the total weight (inherited from the Fractional Perfect Matching) in each part is the same and equal to |V | 2 µ . We prove that the recognition problem for this subclass, a previously unconsidered, combinatorial problem in Fractional Graph Theory [15] , is N P-complete (Proposition 5.7). Hence, the decision problem for the existence of a DefenseOptimal Nash equilibrium is N P-complete as On the positive side, we identify a more restricted subclass of graphs (within the class of graphs with a Fractional Perfect Matching), namely those with a Perfect Matching, that admit a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium in certain, well-characterized and polynomial time recognizable cases (Theorem 5.9).
-When there are µ ≥ β (G) defenders, we identify two cases where there are DefenseOptimal Nash equilibria with some special structure (namely, the balanced Nash equilibria); these can be computed in polynomial time (Theorems 7.1 and 7.2).
• For the the middle range |V | 2 < µ < β (G) of values of µ, we provide a combinatorial proof that there is no graph with a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium (Theorem 6.1). This is somehow paradoxical, since with fewer defenders µ ≤ |V | 2 , we already identified cases with a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium. Since the value of the Defense-Ratio changes around µ = |V | 2 , this paradox may not be wholly surprising.
• For any number of defenders µ, it is always possible to apply a replication technique on the defenders in order to transform a Nash equilibrium for the case of one defender into a Nash equilibrium for µ > 1 defenders (Theorem 8.2). Since a Nash equilibrium for the case of one defender can be computed in polynomial time [9] , this implies that the same holds for the general case as well. Whenever the original Nash equilibrium (for µ = 1) is Defense-Optimal, the resulting Nash equilibrium (for µ > 1) may get arbitrarily close to (but never be) a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium. We propose this technique as a compensation for the cases with no Defense-Optimal Nash equilibria.
Related Work. We emphasize that the assumption of µ > 1 defenders has required a far more challenging combinatorial and graph-theoretic analysis than for the case of one defender studied in [5, 9, 10, 11, 12] . Hence, we view our work as a major generalization of the work in [5, 9, 10, 11, 12] towards the more realistic case of µ > 1 defenders. The notion of Defense-Ratio generalizes a corresponding definition from [9] to the case of µ > 1 defenders. The special case where µ = 1 of Theorem 5.3 was shown in [10] . (Note that this special case allowed for a polynomial time algorithm to decide the existence of and compute a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium.)
Due to page constraints, most proofs have been omitted; they may be found in the full version of this paper available at http://www.cs.ucy.ac.cy/∼mavronic/.
Background and Preliminaries
Graph Theory. For an integer n ≥ 1, denote [n] = {1, . . . , n}. Throughout, we consider a simple undirected graph G = V, E (with no isolated vertices). We will sometimes model an edge as the set of its two end vertices. For a vertex set U ⊆ V , denote as G(U ) the subgraph of G induced by U . For an edge set F ⊆ E, denote as G(F ) the subgraph of G induced by F ; denote as [2] for an efficient combinatorial algorithm.) The same holds for the corresponding search problem.
We prove that for a Fractional Perfect Matching f , the graph G(E f ) has no pendant edges. This implies that each component of the graph G(E f ) is either a single edge or a subgraph without pendant edges. Given two Fractional Match- While G(E f ) has an even cycle C do:
(2) Define a function g : E(C) → {−1, 0, +1} with g(e) = +1 or − 1 alternately, starting with g(e0) = −1.
While G(E f ) has an odd cycle C that is not a component do:
an edge e0 = (v0, v1) ∈ Ef with v1 ∈ V (C).
(2/a) Find a DFS path v1, v2, · · · , vr with vr = vl for some l, 1 ≤ l < r − 1.
Proceedings 
Framework
Fix now a mixed profile s. The support of player i ∈ N in the profile s, denoted as Support s (i), is the set of pure strategies in S i to which i assigns strictly positive probability. Denote as
that is, a multidefender vertex is "hit" by more than one defenders. Else, the vertex v is unidefender. A profile s is unidefender if every vertex v ∈ V is unidefender in s.
A mixed profile s induces a probability measure P s in the natural way. D k , v) ) . From this expression, we immediately observe:
Lemma 3.1 Assume that vertex v is multidefender in s.
Then, P s (Hit(v)) < Di∈ND P s (Hit(D i , v) ) .
A vertex v ∈ V is maxhit in the profile s if P s (Hit(v)) = 1; a defender D i ∈ N D is a maxhitter in s if there is an edge e ∈ Support s (D i ) such that P s (Hit(D i , v) , v) ) .
• The Conditional Expected Individual Profit 
Then, the Expected Individual Profit IP s (D i ) of defender D i takes a particularly simple form:
Lemma 3.4 Fix a mixed profile s. Then, for any
Clearly, in a Nash equilibrium s, for each attacker
is constant over all edges e ∈ Support s (D i ). It follows that in a Nash equilibrium s, for each attacker
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For an edge set
Some special profiles. A profile s is uniform if each player uses a uniform probability distribution on its support; so, for each attacker 
A profile is attacker symmetric uniform (resp., defender symmetric uniform) if it is attacker symmetric (resp., defender symmetric) and each attacker (resp., defender) uses a uniform probability distribution on his support. A profile is attacker fully mixed (resp., defender fully mixed) if for each attacker A i (resp., for each defender
The Structure of Nash Equilibria
We provide an extensive combinatorial analysis of Nash equilibria. We first prove:
Proposition 4.1 (Characterization of Nash Equilibria)
A profile s is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the following conditions hold:
We remark that Proposition 4.1 generalizes a corresponding characterization of Nash equilibria for Π ν,1 (G) shown in [12] , where Condition (2) had the simpler counterpart: (2') For each edge e ∈ Supports s (D), VP s (e) = max e ∈E {VP s (e )}. We continue to prove: We are now ready to provide a significant definition:
We will later construct Defense-Optimal Nash equilibria; so, max 1, |V | 2µ is a tight lower bound on Defense-Ratio, and this will justify our definition of Defense-Optimal Nash equilibria. Say that G admits a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibirum or that G is Defense-Optimal (with respect to the particular parameter µ) if there is a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium for the strategic game Π ν,µ (G). This leads to the formulation of a natural decision problem:
DEFENSE OPTIMAL GRAPH INSTANCE: A graph G = V, E and an integer µ. QUESTION: Is G Defense-Optimal (with respect to µ)?
We continue to prove:
Proposition 4.5 In a Nash equilibrium s, Supports s (D) is an Edge Cover, and Supports s (A) is a Vertex Cover of G(Supports s (D)).
We use Propositions 4.5 and 4.5 to prove:
Proposition 4.6 (Necessary Condition for Pure Nash Equilibria) Assume that G is pure. Then, µ ≥ β (G) and ν ≥ min EC ∈EC(G) β(G(EC)).
We finally prove: Proposition 4.7 A Defender Pure Nash equilibrium is Defense-Optimal.
Few Defenders
We consider the case of few defenders where µ ≤ |V | 2 . There, a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium s has DR s = max 1, |V | 2 µ = |V | 2µ . We start with a structural property of Defense-Optimal Nash equilibria:
Then, a DefenseOptimal Nash equilibrium is unidefender.
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Characterization of Defense-Optimal Graphs. We continue with a new graph-theoretic definition.
Definition 5.1 Fix an integer
Note that for µ = 1, the existence problem for a 1-partitionable Fractional Perfect Matching is trivially the one for a Fractional Perfect Matching, which can be solved in polynomial time [2] . We observe a preliminary property of µ-partitionable Fractional Perfect Matchings:
We prove a characterization of Defense-Optimal graphs:
Then, a graph G is Defense-Optimal if and only if G has a µ-partitionable
Fractional Perfect Matching.
Theorem 5.3 immediately implies:
Complexity of Defense-Optimal Graphs. By Theorem 5.3, the complexity of recognizing Defense-Optimal graphs is that of the following, previously unconsidered combinatorial problem from Fractional Graph Theory [15] : We are now ready to prove:
Proposition 5.6 A graph G has a µ-partitionable Fractional Perfect Matching if and only if E can be partitioned into a collection E 1 , · · · , E µ of µ vertex-disjoint subsets and corresponding vertex sets
V 1 , · · · , V µ , so that i∈[µ] V i = V , each E i
is a collection of single edges and odd cycles, and |V
We shall show an interesting relation of the problem of deciding the existence of a µ-partitionable Fractional Perfect Matching to a well known graph-theoretic problem:
Graphs with Perfect Matchings. We now restrict to graphs with Perfect Matchings. We show: • s is Attacker Symmetric Uniform and Attacker Fully Mixed. So, for each attacker
• Partition M into µ subsets, each with |V | 2µ edges; each defender uses a uniform probability distribution over each one subset. Thus, Support s (D) = M and each edge is unidefender in s.
We now establish Conditions (1) and (2) in the characterization of Nash equilibria (Proposition 4.1).
• For Condition (1), fix any vertex v ∈ V . Since M is a (Perfect) Matching, there is a single edge e ∈ Edges s (v). Since e is unidefender (say by defender
. Now, Condition (1) follows trivially.
• For Condition (2), consider any defender
Since M is an Edge Cover, it follows that for the vertex v (resp., vertex u ), there is a defender 
is a Perfect Matching, this implies that P s (Hit(v)) = s Di (e). We prove that
Note that Corollary 5.4 applies to all graphs, while Proposition 5.11 applies only to graphs with a Perfect Matching. However, the restriction of Corollary 5.4 to graphs with a Perfect Matching does not imply Proposition 5.11 unless µ is odd. (This is because 2 divides |V | and µ divides |V | imply together that 2µ divides |V | exactly when µ is odd.)
Many Defenders
We now consider the case of many defenders, where |V | 2 < µ < β (G). Note that in this case, a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium has Defense-Ratio DR s = max 1, |V | 2 µ = 1.
Theorem 6.1 (Non-existence of Defense-Optimal)
Assume that |V | 2 < µ < β (G). Then, G admits no Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium.
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Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, that G admits a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium s. So, DR s = 1. Corollary 4.3 implies that MinHit s = 1. It follows that for each vertex v ∈ V , P s (Hit(v)) = 1; so, all vertices are maxhit. So, fix a (maxhit) vertex v ∈ V . The expression
implies that there is at least one maxhitter D i ∈ N D (a defender D i such that P s (Hit(D i , v) 
Use s to construct a defender-pure profile t as follows: The pure strategy of each (multihitter or not) defender D k is some edge from Support s (D k ). Note that, by construction of t, (1) Support t (D) ≤ µ, and (2) the number of maxhit vertices in s is at most the number of maxhit vertices in t. Since µ < β (G), (1) implies that |Supports t (D)| < β (G). So, there is some vertex v ∈ V such that P t (Hit(v)) = 0. It follows that the number of maxhit vertices in t is at most |V | − 1. By (2), it follows that the number of maxhit vertices in s is at most |V | − 1. A contradiction.
Too Many Defenders
We finally turn to the case of too many defenders, where µ ≥ β (G). Note that, in this case, a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium s has Defense-Ratio DR s = max 1,
For the analysis, we will use a special class of profiles that we introduce. A profile s is balanced if there is a constant c > 0 such that for each pair of a defender
Clearly, in a balanced profile, (i) for each defender
, it follows that the support of each defender is an Edge Cover; note that this (necessary) condition is stronger than the necessary condition in Proposition 4.5. From (ii), it follows that the supports of attackers is V ; note that this (necessary) condition is weaker than the condition in the definition of an attacker fully mixed profile. Note also that by definition, a balanced profile satisfies Condition (2) in the characterization of Nash equilibria (Proposition 4.1). We have been unable to construct mixed balanced profiles for the general case. So, we focused on the special case of pure strategies. A defenderpure balanced profile is a defender-pure profile s such that there is a constant c > 0 such that for each vertex v ∈ V , VP s (v) defenders s (v) = c. We prove that that a defender-pure balanced profile is a local maximizer for the Individual Profit of each defender.
We will present polynomial time algorithms to compute Defender-Pure Balanced Nash equilibria in two cases. Both algorithms will rely on a polynomial time algorithm for computing a Minimum Edge Cover.
Defender-Pure Balanced Nash Equilibria. We show:
Theorem 7.1 Assume that µ ≥ β (G). Then, G admits a Defense-Optimal, Defender-Pure Nash equilibrium, which can be computed in polynomial time.
To prove Theorem 7.1, we present a polynomial time algorithm Defender-Pure&BalancedNE to compute a Defender-Pure Balanced Nash equilibrium:
Algorithm Defender-Pure&BalancedNE INPUT: A graph G(V, E) and a pair of integers ν and µ such that β (G) ≤ µ. OUTPUT: A Defender-Pure Balanced Nash equilibrium s. (4) Arbitrarily, assign probability distributions to the attackers so that for each vi ∈ V , VPs(vi) = VP(vi).
Pure Balanced Nash Equilibria. We now prove that adding a further constraint to those in Theorem 7.1 allows for a (Defense-Optimal) Pure Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 7.2 Assume that µ ≥ β (G) and 2 µ divides ν.
Then, G admits a Defense-Optimal, Pure Nash equilibrium, which can be computed in polynomial time.
To prove Theorem 7.2, we present a polynomial time algorithm Defender-Pure&Balanced to compute a Pure Balanced Nash equilibrium:
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Algorithm Pure&BalancedNE INPUT: A graph G(V, E) and integers µ and ν such that β (G) ≤ µ and ν 2 ≡ 0 (mod µ). OUTPUT: A Pure Balanced Nash equilibrium s. 
Replicated Defenders
We use an involved combinatorial analysis to prove: 
